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ABSTRACT
Opening a port on the internet typically involves signaling a request for consent to
consider whether a random incoming connection is good enough to continue. Denial-ofService (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks can exploit this process by spamming
connection attempts. However, in order to be a service the host and port are to be advertised
to the network that is to be connected and (at least in Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4))
sweeping all open ports in a likely range is a perfectly feasible option. Presented herein
are techniques that utilize a novel frequency-hopping approach to listening ports in order
to implement consent-based networking.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Techniques presented herein consider networking in the context of a model of
'consent'. In Transmission Control Protocol, for instance, a device must first consent to
receiving inbound connections from anywhere. Once this is done, the device gives
consideration to whether it further consents to accept a proposed incoming connection (e.g.,
listen() as the first step, accept() as the second).
At each stage of consent, the receiver accepts that incoming connections passing
the bar are worth central processing unit (CPU) time. However, in the current model of
networking that bar is low (listen()ing on a well-known and widely guessable port) and is
an opening for attacks.
This proposal seeks to raise the bar of what is considered consent to consider an
incoming connection further. Thus, a server can listen, but there is a much lower possibility
that an incoming connection requires further consideration - for instance, through external
agreement between the server and the client.
Using the notion of frequency hopping, it is proposed herein that a server listens on
a continuously changing port and address. Assuming IP version 6 (IPv6) addressing and
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that a server can be assigned an entire /64 address, for instance, there are 80 bits of entropy
in the destination address and port, slightly more if the source port can be used as entropy
as well. However, it is infeasible to sweep an 80-bit range for an open port and, given the
changing nature, the results of such a sweep would be quickly invalidated.
If address and port are shifted based on wall clock time, then there can be no easy
way for an attacker to guess which port is open at any given moment; that a port was open
at a previous time does not mean that it is open now. If this open port is based on a random
number generator (RNG) function based on wall clock time and a seed, then sharing the
seed with another party serves as consent to consider that party's incoming packets. Further,
since the endpoint can be listening on multiple ports at a time using multiple seeded RNGs,
this technique can offer revocable consent to many parties simultaneously.
Now, while opening ports and listening can happen on the server, this would mean
it would have to consider and discard even packets sent to closed ports. This spoils the idea
that an endpoint should only have to spend time considering connections from endpoints
with which it has established a consent relationship (i.e., the RNG seed). However, servers
are an expensive place to determine if an incoming network has consent. DoS attacks,
either connection floods or SYN floods, involving the simple act of managing or rejecting
connections can increase server load to the point where no useful work can be performed.
Following the details above, the network devices can be used to augment
connectivity to provide the 'frequency hopping' aspect of the techniques of this proposal.
Two choices exist to implement such functionality:
1. A network device can be instructed by the server to open ports in rotation,
dictated by the RNG; or
2. A network device can be given the RNG and software or hardware on the
network device adjusts its rules.
Such a network device might also provide a port-rewrite function so that a server
running software in a completely conventional manner can listen on a fixed port and
incoming packets arriving on multiple ports, as dictated by the frequency hopping
functionality, can be rewritten in the network device to the fixed port of the service.
Finally, techniques herein can assume the lack of a precise clock synchronization
between sender and receiver and delays in transit. Thus, in the case that ports are opened
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using a make-before-break approach, a new port can be opened slightly early and the old
port can be closed slightly late so that packets that falls slightly outside the timing window
of the open port will nevertheless be forwarded.
Figure 1, below, illustrates example details associated with a system that may be
utilized to implement the frequency hopping techniques presented herein.

Figure 1: Frequency Hopping System Details
During operation as illustrated in Figure 1, for example, a stream of numbers is
used to determine which port is listening at any given moment. In this instance, a pseudo
RNG can be used on both ends (for a client and a service) that generates the same set of
numbers, which can only be true if both ends have the same seed.
The client will send its packets to the currently open port. Here, a rewrite
mechanism can be used, which is likely how such functionality would be implemented for
maximum simplicity.
The service listens only on the port or ports that are currently open. The service
again can include a rewrite mechanism, but a firewall preceding the service can also be
synchronously programmed to block any unexpected traffic.
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Accordingly, techniques herein may facilitate network connections using various
frequency hopping approaches. In contrast to other approaches, such as port knocking,
port knocking requires that a device knock on a port or sequence of ports in order for
another port to open on the same device. For the techniques presented herein, however, it
is proposed that a port can be open at any given moment but the open port cannot be
predicted. It is not opened because of (and only in response to) an external event; rather, it
is open because of the wall-knock time. Another approach, spread-spectrum TCP (SSTCP)
requires that TCP headers are modulated in order to convey sufficient cryptographic
information that a port will open. However, the techniques herein do not suggest that a
port opens because of an event.
In summary, techniques herein may facilitate consent in the form of frequency
hopping of ports. A rotating scheme of ports is proposed that allows for consent based on
the scheme used to rotate ports on which to listen.
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